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The Lethality Ratio of  
   Anti-vehicle Mines
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-person-
nel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention or APMBC) brought AP 
mines to the forefront of many people’s minds. Anti-vehicle mines, however, remain the most lethal 
mines today, and they are not banned under international conventions.
by Armen Harutyunyan
Since the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-
personnel Mine Ban Convention or APMBC) in 1997, the 
issue of AP landmines has received much needed interna-
tional attention. Over the past 15 years, the vast majority of 
governments have signed and rati-
fied the APMBC. Most of those who 
have not adopted it formally claim to 
not have used or produced AP mines. 
More recently, in the late 2000s, clus-
ter munitions came into the spotlight, 
culminating in the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, which more than 
100 countries adopted in 2008. While 
two dedicated treaties exist banning the use of AP mines and 
cluster munitions, anti-vehicle mines remain largely unregu-
lated in most countries for use in armed conflicts.1
The Vital Few
Most online resources present data on civilian and demin-
ing casualties by dividing incidents based on the devices that 
caused them. This usually compels readers to examine the 
causes of higher number of incidents and make conclusions 
as to which devices are the most lethal. While this is one of 
the methods to measure the impact caused by various explo-
sive devices, it does not necessarily reveal which devices have 
higher hit rates or lethality rates. This type of information is 
crucial to decide where to focus mine action assets in order to 
address immediate humanitarian threats.
Perhaps another way to look at the scale of a mine problem 
is to compare the ratio of the average number of devices found 
over a period of time against the number of incidents and ca-
sualties caused by a particular type of device over the same 
time frame. This type of lethality ratio analysis allows com-
parison between the two most important data sets in mine 
clearance and can be used as an additional tool in the deci-
sion-making process.
Lethality ratio analysis of mine related incidents in a num-
ber of countries indicates that AV mines do not account for 
the majority of mine and other explosive remnants of war in-
cidents. However, they certainly are 
the most lethal considering the few-
er numbers in which they are usu-
ally laid. This theory of more effect 
by fewer emplacements broadly re-
sembles the Pareto Principle, or the 
law of the vital few. The Pareto Prin-
ciple points out that for some events, 
80 percent of the effects come from 
20 percent of causes. The analysis of the lethality ratios of AV 
mines in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Sudan (now 
Sudan and South Sudan) indicates that the law of the vital few 
can be applicable to mine action. Theoretically, if managers 
focus their attention on resolving those 20 percent of the vi-
tal few, they should eliminate a larger share of their problems.
Anti-vehicle Mines in Sudan
In the territory of the former country of Sudan, fewer 
numbers of AV mines are found than AP landmines. An aver-
age of 24 percent of all mines cleared in Sudan between 2002 
and 2011 were AV mines.2 Despite the relative low numbers of 
AV mines laid in Sudan, their impact on affected populations 
seems much greater than that of AP mines. Not only do AV 
mines cause a higher ratio of injuries and deaths per incident, 
they also have greater impact on blockage of areas for the ci-
vilian population. Even after years of mine clearance and 
45,000 km (27,962 mi) of road assessment and verification, 
the Information Management System for Mine Action indi-
cates that road blockage (which is mostly caused by anti-tank 
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minefields) remains one of the most common impacts of 
mines on the remaining affected communities in Sudan.3 Ap-
plying the introduced lethality ratio method to Sudan from 
2005–2011, one AV mine incident occurred for every 141 AV 
mines found in Sudan (141:1). The AP mine ratio is 382:1, i.e., 
one incident per 382 AP mines found. In other words, each 
AV mine is 2.7 times more likely to cause an incident than 
each AP mine. As seen in Table 3, the statistics for the casual-
ties are even more dramatic, where each 31st (31:1) AV mine 
caused death or injuries to a person, against the 446:1 ratio of 
an AP mine. This makes each AV mine in Sudan 14.4 times 
more likely to maim or kill a person than each AP mine.4
Situation in Other Mine-affected Countries
Sudan is not the only country with such a high AV mine 
hit rate. Tables 3, 4 and 5 present a snapshot of the most re-
cent situations in three of the most mine-affected countries: 
Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia.
In Afghanistan, AV mines represented only around 5 per-
cent of all mines found in 2011, yet they accounted for more 
than 37 percent of the mine casualties registered during the 
same year.5 Again, as in Sudan, an AV mine is more than 10 
times more likely to cause death or injury than an AP mine.
In Angola, AV mines represented 11 percent of all mines 
found in 2010, yet they accounted for 31 percent of mine ca-
sualties during the same year. Each AV mine was four times 
more likely to cause death or injury than each AP mine.
In Cambodia the situation in 2010 appears to be the most 
dramatic. AV mines constituted only 2 percent of mines 
found during 2010, but accounted for more than 55 percent 
of all registered casualties across the country. The lethality 
ratio in Cambodia reveals that every 11th AV mine killed or 
maimed a person and that AV mines are 58 times more likely 
to cause a casualty than AP mines. 
Observations
Most national and international mine action organiza-
tions have continued treating all mines and ERW as equal-
ly dangerous for those who live in mine/ERW-contaminated 
areas without necessarily giving a higher clearance priority to 
AP mines. Some believe AV mines create a greater problem 
to vulnerable populations as well as to humanitarian agen-
cies delivering aid.9 Various sources indicate that the number 
of mine casualties resulting from AV mines is usually lower 
than casualties caused by AP mine incidents. For example, the 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reports that in 2010, 
out of 1,650 identified mine-related casualties worldwide, AV 
mines caused around 23 percent.10 The analysis of incident in-
formation in this article reiterates the magnitude of the prob-
lem that AV mines pose for mine-affected countries.
While most of the analyzed country data only covers 
a short period of time, three thoughts arise when examin-
ing the statistics produced by the lethality ratio method de-
scribed previously.
First, mine clearance organizations should pay more at-
tention to the causes of incidents in their areas of operation 
when prioritizing minefields for clearance. While theory in 
mine action does not always find a justified practical use, hy-
pothetically, if some of the money and effort in clearing 103 
AP mines in Sudan was used to clear the same number of 
Types of Blockage Number of Communities
Roads 44
Pasture Land 37




Table 1. Blockage types caused by AT 
mines in Sudan.







AP mines 382:1 446:1 1606:1 618:1
AV mines 141:1 31:1 86:1 48:1
Table 2. Lethality ratios—number of devices found per number of incidents and ca-
sualties in Sudan between 2005–2011.
Device Casualties Devices found Devices per casualty
AP mines 17 24,317 1,430:1
AV mines 10 1,088 109:1
Table 3. Lethality ratio of AP and AT mines in  
Afghanistan, 2011.5,6
Device Casualties Devices found Devices per casualty
AP mines 9 7,552 839 :1
AV mines 4 857 214 :1
Table 4. Lethality ratio of AP and AV mines  
in Angola, 2010.7
Device Casualties Devices found Devices per casualty
AP mines 63 40,320 640:1
AV mines 78 831 11:1
Table 5. Lethality ratio of AP and AV mines in  
Cambodia, 2010.8
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AV mines in Sudan, at least three people 
could have been saved from death or in-
jury. It is usually easier and cheaper to 
clear AP mines than to clear AV mines.11 
However, in some countries, getting rid 
of the majority of AV mines first might 
save more lives and prevent more inju-
ries. Perhaps a Pareto-like rule could 
have a wider application within mine 
action when prioritizing which tasks to 
complete first.
Second, the absence of a prohibition 
on the use of AV mines in the APMBC 
downplays their humanitarian impact. 
The APMBC did not cover AV mines 
due to a debate at the time that military 
use of AV mines outweighs the potential 
humanitarian impact that they might 
cause.11 This debate continued in the 
CCW from 2000 to 2006 during negotia-
tions to regulate mines other than anti-
personnel landmines but failed because 
of similar disagreements. In 2011, CCW 
States Parties initiated expert talks on 
this issue again at which certain states 
continued to question the humanitarian 
impact of mines other than anti-person-
nel landmines. From 1999 to 2010 the 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 
identified more than 5,000 AV mine ca-
sualties; more than 75 percent were civil-
ians.12 The available data leaves no doubt 
about the scale of the humanitarian im-
pact of AV mines. The AV mine lethality 
ratio is more likely to increase if its use is 
not regulated or prohibited.
Third, the APMBC’s success might 
become overshadowed if the sides of dif-
ferent ongoing or possible future armed 
conflicts decide to use AV mines more 
frequently, as AP mines are becoming 
more difficult to obtain. While this is 
just a theoretical assumption without 
sufficient existing evidence, the possi-
bility of this assumption becoming a re-
ality is already being discussed.11
Conclusion
Continuing to clear AP mines is im-
portant. However, when analyzing 
mine action-related information, con-
sider that while the AV mines are laid in 
fewer numbers (as frequently indicated 
by the number of mines found during 
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mine clearance worldwide), they cause 
multiple deaths and injuries per inci-
dent. As seen in the recent study by the 
Geneva International Centre for Hu-
manitarian Demining, the average 
number of casualties per AV mine inci-
dent is twice the average number of vic-
tims per AP mine incident.13 
Furthermore, as frequently taught dur-
ing various ERW safety training ses-
sions, the proximity of areas that could 
have been of strategic importance to 
one of the conflicting sides is one of the 
first things to be aware of when in re-
cent combat areas. These are areas 
where AV mines are often laid, typically 
including routes, roads and bridges—
vital infrastructure that people will use 
many years after a conflict ends. These 
two factors greatly contribute to the 
high lethality ratio of AV mines, which 
is certainly the case of AV mine lethal-
ity in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia 
and Sudan. 
See endnotes page 67
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